Individual pluralism : a theory of persistence

This thesis introduces and develops a theory of persistence termed ‘individual pluralism’. According to individual pluralism, individuals persist through time as pluralities of instantaneous entities connected by genidentity relation and are subject to certain criteria of individuation. The theory rejects the existence of temporally extended entities and holds that all entities are instantaneous. Initially, the thesis clarifies the concept of individuality by differentiating it from related terms such as ‘entity’ and ‘object’. Drawing on the ideas of Kurt Lewin and E.J. Lowe, it characterizes individuals as pluralities of instantaneous entities collectively instantiating sorts, thereby resolving tensions inherent in traditional singular conceptions of individuality. The thesis then explores the characteristics of genidentity and focuses on the question of whether genidentity is an ontological dependence relation or grounding relation. The conclusion is that it depends on whether we think that ontological dependence or grounding has priority against the other, and genidentity is the relation that has priority. Additionally, the thesis investigates criteria of individuation, particularly emphasizing their application to artifactual sorts. It argues that individuation for artifacts significantly depends on the creators’ intentions and the artifacts’ sort-related functions, explicitly excluding non-sort-related or idiosyncratic functions. Finally, the practical applications of individual pluralism are demonstrated through its solutions to classic metaphysical problems of persistence, including the problem of change, the problem of diachronic identity, and the problem of coincidence. Individual pluralism resolves these issues by redefining identity and change within a plural logic framework, focusing on collective actions and dynamic processes rather than static property changes.