Airpower Theory, Close Air Support, and a New Approach to the Forward Air Controller in the Vietnam War

Since the Vietnam War’s conclusion, scholars have stubbornly concentrated on campaigns like LINEBACKER I and II instead of diverse close air support missions. The consequent ignorance of close air support’s maturity and forward air controllers’ contributions during Vietnam obscures the Air Force’s greatest success in Southeast Asia. A new way of looking at airpower in Vietnam is required as few historians have addressed the relationship between evolving close air support practices and United States Air Force (USAF) doctrine. These omissions must be addressed if scholars are to offer counterarguments to the historiographical primacy of interdiction. Otherwise, those who formulate Air Force doctrine risk repeating the mistakes of their predecessors. Despite America’s defeat, close air support played a major role in the USAF’s only doctrinal success—the emergence of a threatening, coordinated tactical air arm. Such innovation from an underfunded program and the growth of the forward air controller role after its lack of incorporation post-Korean War are more than simply impressive. These strengths and the vital usage of tactical air in the Vietnam War disprove assumptions about airpower’s capabilities, application in counterinsurgent campaigns, and contentious relationship with other branches and technologies.