Using Stasis Theory as a Heuristic for Examining Epistemological Dilemmas in a Post-Truth Landscape

This is an accepted article with a DOI pre-assigned that is not yet published.The current definition of post-truth creates an adversarial relationship with rhetorical theory, relying on a positivist stance toward epistemology. Additionally, the most public-facing scholarship concerning post-truth tends to view knowledge in rather concrete ways, failing to account for the nuance of differing types of knowledge and rhetorical situations. As a result, most of the pragmatic approaches to dealing with disingenuous post-truth rhetorical tactics are predicated on positivism (e.g., fact-checking) and post-truth gets either downplayed or only treated theoretically in rhetorical scholarship. This article redefines post-truth in a manner more amendable to rhetorical theory and presents a heuristic predicated on stasis theory as a method for evaluating the epistemic certainty of rhetorical claims. The heuristic is then used to analyze an exchange from an episode of the podcast Armchair Expert to demonstrate how rhetorical discourse can become unproductive and adversarial when interlocutors claim an inappropriate amount of epistemic certainty, in particular by treating value-based claims as facts. Discussions of the post-truth dilemma need to extend beyond the confines of the current definition to include all discursive practices that ascribe the wrong amount of epistemic certainty to particular claims, not just practices that challenge established knowledge and facts.