On the connection between sport and morality: does Russell’s ‘continuity thesis’ hold water?

The connection between sport and morality is a key focus of J. S. Russell’s scholarly work. He rejects the ‘separation thesis’, which claims that sport has a significant degree of autonomy and thus its own set of values separate from those of society. Instead, he supports the ‘continuity thesis,’ which suggests that the moral values at the heart of sport reflect more basic moral values found outside its boundaries. Therefore, for Russell, individuals involved in sport do not leave ordinary morality to enter a separate sporting one. Rather, they engage in a social practice whose core moral principles are extensions of broader morality. In this paper, we challenge Russell’s defense of the continuity thesis by analyzing his writings on the role of play in sport and the value of dangerous sport. The opening section reviews the separation and continuity theses. Next, we critique Russell’s defense of the continuity thesis, presenting him with two options outlined in the following section. One option is to more effectively explain how his defense of the continuity thesis aligns with the moral exceptionalism he supports for play and dangerous sports, as well as the actions and valuations they foster and legitimize. The second option is to consider whether, in some cases, certain values are discontinuous with and therefore do not simply express, reflect, or reinforce general moral ideals and commitments outside sport. In that section, we also propose an alternative to the dyadic conceit—the ‘separanuity thesis’—to clarify the link between sport and morality, and we encourage Russell to reflect on it in light of our examination of his work. We close by outlining how his discussion of risk and play affirms our proposal.