Problems and intuitions

The goal of this thesis is to present good reasons for thinking that some problems central to philosophical discussions rest on a partly misguided methodological approach that can be safely discarded. More precisely, it is the contention of this work that a variety of philosophical difficulties and puzzles arise due to, among other things, an overly liberal usage of what is referred to as "intuitive reasoning" in this dissertation. <br> Among the problems that might turn out to be resolvable through a more critical attitude towards intuitive reasoning are classic, but also more recently described, philosophical paradoxes. The philosophical strategy for dealing with these problems, as defended in this work, is mainly illustrated through a discussion of an epistemological paradox called the "Cartesian paradox". <br> For a very rough characterization of intuitive reasoning, one can, at first, point out that appeals to the supposed "obviousness", "plausibility", or "undeniability" of certain propositions are essential to this kind of reasoning. These appeals are then used by the intuitive reasoner to justify philosophical claims. And among the claims justified by an appeal to their supposed "obviousness", "plausibility", or "undeniability" are claims central to the formulation of philosophical difficulties. If this intuitive reasoning is kept in check by suitably restrained skepticism, then certain philosophical difficulties become avoidable. For if a proposition central to a philosophical difficulty lacks the justification it usually gains from intuitive reasoning, then the difficulty itself loses its pressing nature. <br> After an introduction that presents the goals and main lines of reasoning of this thesis, the first part of the work begins with a look back into the philosophical past, where the views of thinkers who have shared a more critical attitude towards intuitive reasoning are briefly discussed. In the first part, the philosophical debate surrounding the so-called "Cartesian paradox" is introduced, and it is explained why trying to solve philosophical paradoxes is a worthwhile endeavor. Sections 1.6. and 1.7. are the core of this thesis, as they lay out the central ideas of the strategy for addressing philosophical difficulties. Section 1.8., in which a variety of possible problems for the proposed strategy are discussed, concludes the first part of the thesis. <br> The second part of the work explores how restrained skepticism towards intuitive reasoning can not only be used to dissolve paradoxes but can also be applied to fruitfully address conceptual philosophical questions. Finally, the third part examines some of the philosophical heritage of the Vienna Circle and how it could be combined with the outlook defended in this thesis. This attempt at a "combination" serves the goal of formulating a philosophical stance that is better equipped than others to free itself from various puzzles, difficulties, and queries by which philosophers are often plagued.