Beyond the Ballot: the Influence of Direct Democracy on Interest Group Behavior

This dissertation examines the impact of the initiative process on state interest group mobilization, characteristics and lobbying tactics and behavior. I develop a mathematical model of how access to the initiative process influences interest groups' decisions. Key aspects of the model include the examination of the effect of uncertainty about voters' preferences and the influence of the initiative on groups' ability to lobby the legislature directly. Using the model I develop three predictions about how initiative states should differ from non-initiative states. The remainder of the dissertation tests these predictions and related implications in a variety of data. First, I find that initiative states are more likely to adopt policies than non-initiative states through event history analyses of capital punishment and casino-style gaming adoptions. Second, I find that initiative states have more interest groups than non-initiative states and that the additional groups come from traditionally under-represented areas. Third, through a survey analysis of interest groups in four states, I find that initiative state groups have larger membership and less resources, on average. These differences in resources are reflected in their lobbying tactics as initiative state groups tend to rely more on outside lobbying tactics. Fourth, I find that, even after controlling for resource differences, initiative state groups still rely more on outside lobbying and less on inside lobbying. These tests confirm the predictions of the model, provide insight into how state interest groups behave and demonstrate the sizable effect of institutions on state interest group politics.