Determinants of Income and Welfare of Rice Farming Families in Jatiluwih Village, Tabanan Regency, Bali Province

This study aims to analyze the phenomenon of moral hazard among agricultural workers in Indonesia within the context of employment relationships, incentive systems, and social protection policies. Moral hazard is understood as behavior that arises when individuals or groups do not fully bear the risks of their actions due to certain guarantees or protections, thus encouraging suboptimal or irresponsible behavior. This study uses a qualitative descriptive approach with data collection techniques through literature studies, in-depth interviews, and field observations in several agricultural areas. The results show that moral hazard occurs in various forms, such as the misuse of fertilizer subsidies, work inefficiencies due to unfair profitsharing systems, and dependence on government assistance without efforts to increase productivity. Factors such as low financial literacy, weak institutional oversight, and unequal relations between sharecroppers and landowners also increase the potential for moral hazard. This study recommends the importance of improving incentive systems, providing moral education and work ethics, and strengthening local institutions as efforts to mitigate moral hazard in the agricultural sector.