Preference reversals in early policy adoption

This study explores how multidimensional policy environments shape elite preference reversals in early policy adoption. Focusing on local politicians’ decision-making processes in asylum policy, the research highlights the significant role of balancing public goods and control incentives in driving reversals beyond electoral pressures. Through a two-stage survey experiment involving local Greek officials and an embedded conjoint experiment, participants were exposed to both single- and multidimensional framings of a policy on local reception of asylum seekers. The results indicate a two percentage-point increase in support for the policy when presented in a multidimensional context. Furthermore, centre and right-wing politicians are significantly more likely to reverse their initial preferences positively in response to additional incentives, such as financial compensation and enhanced local control over implementation. These findings highlight the role of multidimensional policy incentives and partisan differences in shaping elite decision making, offering insights into how early policy adoption can be influenced by complex policy environments.