Are animals morally relevant beings?

Up until the 17th century, philosophers regarded animals as being quite distinct from human beings; human beings had rationality whereas animals had none. This meant that animals had only instrumental value and could be used in any way that human beings desired. In the 18th century, Immanuel Kant further contributed to this view with his deontological ethics. However, as the Age of Enlightenment approached, Jeremy Bentham (1823), a radical thinker, challenged this notion by asserting that animals possess intrinsic value and should be included in our moral framework. He contended that the capacity to suffer, rather than rationality, should be the basis for moral consideration. In this essay, I will be comparing and contrasting these two philosophers’ argument on the moral inclusivity of animals. I will begin by identifying the underlying assumptions of both philosophers and evaluating their validity. Next, I will delve into one of the key premises in Kant’s argument, as it presents greater complexity compared to Bentham’s. Following this, I will compare how each argument aligns with our moral intuitions and explore a few implications of their theories. I will also examine their connections to speciesism. Finally, I will conclude my essay and address the question: “Did they reach their desired conclusion?”