‘Die Weltgeschichte ist das Weltgericht’: Hegel’s Early Critique of Fichte’s Doctrine of Right (Jena 1801‐1806)

In this paper, I present Hegel’s critique of Fichte’s political thought during the Jena period. Hegel’s general critique of Fichte has often been disregarded as unconvincing and unoriginal, but I argue that when one focuses on the specifically empirical aspects of Hegel’s critique, Fichte’s doctrine of right, one can actually see not only the validity of Hegel’s position, but its originality. I take it to be indicative of Hegel’s future approach to philosophy, and as such, as an important step in his intellectual development. Focusing on the specifically empirical dimension of Hegel’s critique could seem somewhat surprising since Fichte’s transcendental approach should be immune to such a non-transcendental critique. But I take Hegel’s point to be that insofar as Fichte commits to the ideal of a systematic philosophy which includes a doctrine of right, the empirical and historical should be understood as valid judicative instances for judging such a transcendental approach of right in order to avoid the accusation of formalism. In the end, I show how, according to Hegel, because of his transcendental presuppositions, Fichte can escape neither the accusation of formalism nor the judgment of history. This in turn points out the importance of Hegel’s critique as a manifestation of the early stages of what will soon be Hegel’s own philosophical position as presented in the Phenomenology of Spirit .