Tracking Human Factor Recognition in Occupational Accident Investigations: A 10-Year Review from the Quarrying and Aggregates Sector

Occupational accident investigations are a critical component of safety management systems, particularly in high-risk industries such as quarrying and aggregates. Human factors are widely recognized in academic and applied safety literature as major contributors to workplace incidents. Yet, their explicit recognition within organization-led investigations in high-risk operational environments remains limited. Despite growing awareness, many investigations still lean toward identifying technical, procedural, or rule-based failures, leaving behavioural and cognitive contributors underexplored. This study assesses how human factors are recognized, addressed and interpreted in internal accident investigation reports produced over a ten-year period within a single high-risk industrial company operating in the quarrying and aggregates sector. It examines whether the visibility, frequency, and analytical depth of human factor mentions have developed over time, and evaluates the extent to which investigation practices reflect evolving awareness of cognitive and systemic contributors, beyond general attributions like “human error.” A retrospective review was conducted on 150 formal accident investigation reports generated between 2014 and 2024 by a company operating in the quarrying and aggregates sector. Reports were examined to determine whether human factors were referenced - explicitly (e.g., “fatigue,” “communication failure”) or implicitly through behavioural descriptions. Reports that included human factor references were further examined to identify whether specific categories were cited and whether the analysis extended beyond general terms like “human error” to explore underlying causes. A structured checklist was used to ensure consistency in data collection, recording binary presence/absence data and brief explanatory notes. No qualitative coding was applied. Frequency counts were then compiled by year to observe trends in the visibility and analytical depth of HF mentions across the ten-year period. The analysis showed that human factors were mentioned in 60% of reports across the 10-year period. Of these, only 24% offered any detail beyond vague labels such as “human error” or “personal issue”. There, a range of human factor categories was identified, indicating that multiple behavioural and cognitive aspects were recognized to some extent. However, most of these references focused on the actions or decisions of frontline operators, with significantly fewer mentions of supervisory oversight, team-level interaction, or broader organizational influences. Report frequency varied slightly by year, but the proportion of reports recognizing HF remained largely static. This study highlights that, within the examined company, human factors remain underrepresented in formal accident investigations. Over a ten-year period, there was no notable progress in the depth or frequency of HF inclusion, despite increasing attention to the topic in industry discourse. These findings suggest that changes in safety culture and investigative practices require more than awareness and interventions. While limited to a single company, the results may reflect broader patterns within the sector and warrant further comparative research.