Reasons for Logic, Logic for Reasons

The aim of Reasons for Logic, Logic for Reasons (2024) is to explain the nature of thinking and talking in terms of reason relations.The two fundamental types of reason relations are implication relations ('reasons for ') and incompatibility relations ('reasons against ').These, in turn, are understood in terms of four metavocabularies that specify them in different ways.Over the course of the book, Hlobil and Brandom develop these metavocabularies and systematically investigate the relations between them.The result is a 'metarational functionalist' (p.99) account of consciousness and language in terms of the four roles that reason relations can play.Two of these four metavocabularies are (1) a semantic metavocabulary that makes use of alethic modal expressions and (2) a pragmatic metavocabulary that makes use of deontic normative ones.People already familiar with Brandom's work will be familiar with these metavocabularies, as they characterize Brandom's account of the two poles of intentionality.Whereas subjects are understood as taking claims to stand in relations of normative inclusion and exclusion, the rational practice of doing so is understood as the act of representing objective facts as standing in alethic modal relations.This leads to a ' bimodal hylomorphic conceptual realism' (p.167), according to which there is an isomorphism between (1) our normative practice of treating claims as reasons for and against one another and (2) the objective world, which is understood not as a collection of things but as a collection of facts that stand in objective alethic modal relations.Mind and world are said to share a 'rational form'.Although Brandom has worked out these ideas before, Reasons for Logic, Logic for Reasons (2024) is an effort to spell them out in a much more precise manner.The pragmatic metavocabulary being developed is a normative bilateralist one that includes not only the distinction between the two normative statuses of commitment and entitlement but also the distinction between acceptance