キリスト教倫理における赦しの条件性を巡って（Conditionality of Forgiveness in Christian Ethics)

In Christian ethics, forgiveness is traditionally understood as an unconditional act, modeled after the gratuitous nature of Christ’s sacrificial death. However, this conceptualization of forgiveness has faced increasing scrutiny in recent years, particularly with concerns that offering forgiveness prior to the offender's repentance may perpetuate injustice. Among the foremost proponents of this critique is Anthony Bash, who reframes forgiveness as a ‘moral response,’ asserting that it can only be granted when a necessary moral condition, namely repentance, has been fulfilled. This paper compares Miroslav Volf’s gift-model of forgiveness with Bash’s response-model, particularly focusing on their respective understandings of the conditionality of forgiveness. Although both theologians present divergent perspectives on forgiveness, they share a common commitment to the concept of gift as being non-reciprocal, which is a central tenet of contemporary ‘pure-gift’ theory. An examination of Jacques Derrida’s theory of gift, alongside Ingolf Dalferth’s response, will clarify the contours of non-reciprocity and the modern myth of the ‘pure-gift.’ Finally, this paper argues that John Barclay’s Pauline gift theory offers a necessary correction to the modern interpretation of the ‘pure-gift,’ advancing the debate on the conditionality of forgiveness. As Barclay contends, Paul’s conception of the gift (grace) is unconditioned—prior and incongruous—but not unconditional (non-reciprocal). Building on Barclay’s framework, this paper asserts that forgiveness can be both a prior gift (Volf) and a moral response (Bash). The precedence of forgiveness does not negate the necessity of the offender's repentance; rather, it facilitates and anticipates it.