Tribal Courts are Courts of General Jurisdiction

Twenty years ago, the Supreme Court misread its precedents and took a shortcut to do what was “simpler” instead of what was right. It determined, without examining the origins of tribal judicial power, that tribal courts are not courts of general jurisdiction. Writing for the majority in Nevada v. Hicks, Justice Antonin Scalia concluded that in order to find that tribal courts were able to interpret federal law, the Court would have to “attribute to tribal courts jurisdiction that is not apparent.” But power often exists even if it is not apparent at first glance. Unwilling to do even a cursory examination to determine whether tribal courts might nonetheless possess general jurisdiction, the Court decided that it would be “surely . . . simpler . . . to conclude that tribal courts cannot entertain” claims arising under federal law. This Article objects to the legal principle that tribes cannot exercise their inherent sovereign powers simply because it is “simpler” for the Supreme Court. In Hicks, the Court abdicated its responsibility by not engaging in an analysis of the origins of the judicial power exercised by tribal courts. Under the principles of inherent sovereignty, it is the tribal sovereign, and not the Supreme Court, that controls the jurisdiction of tribal courts. If a tribal government vests in its judicial department the authority to interpret federal law, then the tribal court maintains that power until withdrawn by the tribal sovereign. This Article further argues that the Court in Hicks exceeded its Article III exercise of judicial power to attempt to limit—against the will of the tribal sovereign—the general jurisdiction of tribal courts. It concludes by encouraging tribal governments to decide for themselves whether they want their courts to interpret federal law. If the tribal sovereign assigns that power to its courts, then tribal courts should begin affirmatively exercising general jurisdiction despite Hicks.