Revisiting John Wesley and Divine Command Theory

Wesleyan moral theology is often approached teleologically, as a form of either virtue ethics or natural law ethics, and this approach is often motivated by an interpretation of John Wesley’s writings. In this paper, I critically examine this consensus. I argue that Wesley’s writings underdetermine the shape of Wesleyan moral theology because Wesley’s own views are equally consistent with recent developments in the neighborhood of divine command theory. I contend that a crucial case test for Wesleyan moral theology comes in John Wesley’s rejection of supererogation, a rejection which places him at odds with much of the natural law tradition and raises some questions for virtue ethical expositions of his moral theology. I close with the suggestion that perhaps the more important question is not how to interpret John Wesley, but how the contemporary Wesleyan should think about supererogation and what implications this might have for the shape of Wesleyan moral theology.