Responsabilidade moral e neokantismo sobre a questão metafilosófica

The topic of moral responsibility, specifically the philosophical problem of our acts of praise and blame, is commonly theorized through the correlation between general concepts and their relation to intersubjective experience. Variations and disagreements on the topic can be understood and overcome if analyzed in light of its philosophical nature, involving the metaphilosophical and methodological roots of moral responsibility. The central questions are: why is responsibility a philosophical problem? What is the root of this inquiry? To address these questions, it is necessary to compare theories from the British context of the 19th and 20th centuries, during which P. F. Strawson wrote the most influential paper on the topic. His understanding of the moral problem is linked to a philosophical movement traceable to neo-Kantianism. Despite differences between the British analytical context and neo-Kantianism, both programs are interconnected through a common opposition to scientism and psychologism, emerging from the downfall of Hegelian idealism (albeit from different fronts). Thus, by comparing Strawson and Cassirer, we aim to find a thread that allows for a proper fixation of the philosophical problem, approaching both authors—albeit tenuously—through a metaphilosophical issue.