The Poverty of Morals: An Introduction

This investigation engages with Bernard Williams’ critique of traditional moral theories, particularly focusing on their inability to address the complexities of real-life moral situations. Williams, in Morality: An Introduction to Ethics and Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, argues that certain ethical systems are impersonal, neglecting the nuanced and unpredictable nature of human experience. These theories, he contends, fail to account for the importance of emotions, personal relationships, and the particularities of individual circumstances, thereby undermining personal integrity and commitment. My work extends Williams’ critique by examining the roles of the Moralist, Relativist, Subjectivist, Immoralist, and Amoralist. I argue that Subjectivists and Relativists, though often considered alternative moral agents, fall outside of the moral realm, akin to the Amoralist. This leads to the proposal that morality and ethics must be conceptually separated: morality as an objective good, and ethics as the subjective actions and decisions an agent makes. This separation allows ethical theories to better address the emotional and interpersonal complexities of real life whilst maintaining a foundation for objective moral reasoning. I introduce the concept of moral poverty, which refers to the diminished understanding of morality that arises when individuals operate outside the moral realm, as seen in the Subjectivist and Relativist perspectives. I illustrate how actions justified by subjective or relativistic views often lack genuine moral grounding, and are instead fostered by moral ignorance, leading to ethical justifications that are more about permissibility than true moral value. Ultimately, I argue for a reorientation of moral theory that clearly delineates between the moral and the ethical, allowing for a more applicable understanding of morality that can guide real-world actions without losing sight of the complexities inherent in human life.