Emerging Technology and U.S. Presidential War Powers

Autonomous weapons, anti-satellite weapons (ASAT)s, cyber operations, and drones, among other examples of emerging and advanced technologies, have produced changes in how the United States (U.S.) conducts military operations. This thesis argues these technologies are connected by three common features that make U.S. congressional oversight of their usage by U.S. presidents more challenging. First, these systems enable U.S. presidents to act with increased speed, giving the U.S. Congress less time to respond. Second, some legal arguments suggest many uses of these technologies will not implicate war powers related authorities. Third, the legally unsettled nature of these weapons makes it more difficult for relevant committees, such as the U.S. Senate and House Armed Services, Foreign Affairs, and Intelligence, to fully process information needed for effective oversight. There are several potential concerns related to expansive U.S. presidential unilateral war powers, including increased escalation risk, lack of long-term strategic planning, and decreased democratic accountability. This thesis utilizes case studies of U.S. congressional oversight of drone strikes by the Obama Administration and the U.S. Department of Defense’s 2018 Defend Forward cyber strategy to examine this theoretical framework. These challenges are likely to impact U.S. congressional oversight of the second Trump Administration, 2025 to 2029.