Contraexemplos à la Gettier – Serão Todos Apropriados?

Since the appearing of Gettier’s counterexamples to the traditional definition ofknowledge, in 1963, a bunch of new cases has been presented in order to show that there aremany scenarios where a subject has justified belief but true by luck, in such cases that beliefcannot be properly classified as knowledge. In this paper I will try to show that there are somany putative Gettier cases that ultimately fails to be counted as proper counterexamples— i.e., they are not cases of justified belief luckily true. I will assume Blouw, Buckwater andTurri’s taxonomy of Gettier cases (2017), and then I’ll argue that its main categories areconstituted by unproblematic cases. Just one category — the category of fake barns cases —constitutes one of proper counterexamples, or so I will argue