Voting Rights: Litigating Materiality Under the Civil Rights Act

In recent years, plaintiffs have frequently invoked the Civil Rights Act’s “Materiality Provision” as a basis for challenging state election laws. The Provision prevents states from denying a person’s right to vote based on certain types of immaterial errors or omissions in his voter registration application or other election-related filings. Historically, the Provision played an important role in combatting Jim Crow measures used to systematically disenfranchise African Americans. Today, it continues to protect voters from disenfranchisement based on minor, hypertechnical, “picayune” mistakes unrelated to their eligibility to vote. Some courts, however, have misinterpreted the Provision to prevent states from requiring voters to submit information for reasons other than determining whether they meet the state’s qualifications for electors. Properly construed in light of its text, structure, legislative history, and purpose, as well as pragmatic considerations, the Materiality Provision applies only when the state is attempting to determine a person’s eligibility to be recognized as a qualified elector. Even if a court applied the Provision more broadly, however, measures aimed at confirming a person’s identity or the accuracy of information he provides should be deemed material to establishing his eligibility to vote.