Prosecuting Police

Prosecutors face criticism for prosecuting too many minority members and too few police. Recently, some reformers have won prosecutorial elections by pledging to change these priorities. Yet scholars have identified two impediments to police prosecutions. First, county prosecutors often answer to suburban voters indifferent to the excesses of city police. Second, prosecutors depend on those police to investigate their cases and to endorse them as effective. This Article argues that the influence of residents and police on prosecutorial decisions depends on the political geography of a prosecutor’s office. As a result, whether a prosecutor’s office is “city-based,” “regional,” or “state-appointed” shapes a prosecutor’s motivation and decision to prosecute police. Examining nationwide data on charging police, we find that prosecutors are indeed more likely to prosecute police when a greater proportion of their constituents are served by the same police department. This effect is further amplified at higher levels of Black (but not Hispanic) residency. Case studies of specific prosecutorial districts suggest an explanation for this finding. Urban party organizations and Black civil society networks offer a political infrastructure for mobilizing residents against the abuses of police departments. The degree and impact of this mobilization is greater when more of the prosecutor’s constituents fall under the same police jurisdiction, especially when the prosecutor relies on the same political infrastructure to win elections.