In re Misty Lee H.: Application of the Best Interests Standard in Parental Rights Terminations

The family unit is perhaps America's most deeply rooted social institution. The integrity of the family unit has been repeatedly recognized by the United States Supreme Court as warranting constitutional protection. As a means of protecting family autonomy, natural parents possess a fourteenth amendment liberty interest in the care and custody of their children. The parental liberty interest encompasses a wide range of rights. Although substantial, these parental rights are not absolute. By virtue of the parens patriae power, the state may interfere with parental rights in order to preserve and promote the welfare of the child. The most extreme form of such interference is the permanent severance of the familial relationship between parent and child. In Maine, the termination of parental rights is governed by title 22, section 4055 of the Maine Revised Statutes Annotated. In In re Misty Lee H., the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the Law Court, affirmed a district court judgment terminating a mother's parental rights to her two children. In affirming the judgment, the Law Court held that the district court's findings were properly supported by clear and convincing evidence pursuant to Maine's parental rights termination statute. One member of the Law Court dissented, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support the district court's judgment. The dissent recommended that, pursuant to the best interests standard, "[t]he State should be required to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the consequences in harm to the children of allowing the parent-child relationship to continue are more severe than the consequences of termination of that relationship. This Note examines the application of the best interests of the child standard as a ground for termination of parental rights. This Note agrees with the concerns evidenced by the dissent's recommendation. Moreover, in order to guard more effectively against erroneous termination of parental rights, this Note advocates the adoption of substantive factors to define further the best interests standard. The best interests standard is presently characterized by a large measure of substantive imprecision which, by itself, fosters an unwarranted risk of erroneous decision-making. This risk of error is further exacerbated by two additional factors: the broad discretion granted to judges in applying the standard, and the traditional deference applied by the Law Court when reviewing a judge's best interests findings. Given the grave constitutional nature of a parental rights termination proceeding, the risk of error is unwarranted. This Note argues that the Law Court should articulate specific decision-making criteria under the best interests standard in order to diminish more effectively the likelihood of an erroneous severing of the parent-child relationship and ultimately to protect better the child's welfare.