The Precedential Weight of Summary Dispositions of Appeals

The extent to which the Supreme Court's summary dispositions of appeals are entitled to precedential weight presents a serious problem for lower courts confronted with cases involving issues similar to those previously disposed of in a summarily decided appeal. A recent source of confusion in this area was the Supreme Court's 1975 opinion in Hicks v. Miranda. In Hicks, the lower court held a California statute unconstitutional despite the fact that one year earlier the Supreme Court had summarily dismissed an appeal from a decision upholding the constitutionality of the same statute., The Supreme Court reversed, pointing out that its summary dispositions of appeals are decisions on the merits that lower courts must respect as binding precedents. Accordingly, last year in Mandel v. Bradley the Court significantly limited its Hicks dictum by emphasizing that summary dispositions, as precedents, are to be narrowly confined to their specific facts. Following a description of the Supreme Court's summary review procedures, this Comment will attempt to define the relationship between the doctrine of stare decisis and summary dispositions of appeals in light of Hicks v. Miranda. The problem is first considered in the context of a summary disposition that is obviously applicable to a later case. Next, the problem of overbroad interpretation of more ambiguous summary dispositions is identified and illustrated with examples from lower court decisions. Finally, Mandel v. Bradley is analyzed for its future significance for the use of summary dispositions of appeals as precedents.