Lightweight cross domain authentication for satellite internet

With the evolution of next-generation network technologies, ubiquitous networks have developed rapidly, and heterogeneous integrated architectures, particularly satellite networks, have significantly enhanced information service capabilities. However, open network environments have introduced security risks such as device identity spoofing and data link hijacking, which posed severe challenges to trusted access in satellite networks. Traditional authentication schemes have been constrained by complex certificate management mechanisms and reliance on third-party key distribution centers. To address these issues, a cross-domain device authentication framework based on certificateless public key cryptography (CL-PKC) was proposed. The framework achieved system optimization through three key technical breakthroughs. First, a key parameter splitting mechanism was introduced to eliminate single-point failure risks in traditional key centers. Second, a cross-domain identity mapping protocol was developed to resolve trusted identity migration across heterogeneous networks. Third, dynamic anonymous identification technology was applied to enhance privacy protection throughout the key lifecycle management process. Experimental evaluations demonstrate that compared to traditional PKI solutions, the proposed scheme could resist multiple typical security threats. In resource-constrained satellite network scenarios, while maintaining equivalent security strength, the computational cost of the scheme remains within acceptable levels, indicating its significant engineering applicability.