EXPERIMENTS AND MODELING OF PMU UNDER GPS SPOOFING ATTACKS

Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs) require an accurate timing signal, which is generally broadcast once per second and communicated to the PMU. While other timing protocols exist, internal clock actively synchronized to GPS time. This GPS dependence creates a potential cybersecurity vulnerability that requires attention. In this thesis, two critical aspects of GPS Spoofing Attacks (GSAs) were investigated. First, laboratory experiments on how a commercial PMU, compliant with the IEEE C37.118 standard, responds to a variety of GSAs. This work examines the ability of PMUs to detect certain spoofing attacks, highlighting cases where detection fails. The characteristic signature of the PMU response is analyzed and its cause explained. Second, a phasor-domain PMU/GSA model was built to study the behavior of power systems under spoofing conditions. This model was implemented in transient simulation software and used to assess the impact of spoofing on a transient-stability remedial action scheme.