When Does a Lie Become an Obstruction of Justice?

(Excerpt) Most people agree that lying is wrong. The early English, for example, were particularly sensitive to lying: “King Alfred provided that the slanderer shall have his tongue cut out, unless he could redeem it with the price of his head.” But determining which lies are culpable, if any, is thorny; some say harm-causing lies are culpable, while others disagree, advising caution. Naturally, this debate has found its way into our law. One example lies in the obstruction of justice adjustment—a sentencing enhancement in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (“the Guidelines”). How does that provision determine when a lie is culpable? That is the question this Note seeks to answer. Specifically, this Note seeks to determine when a lie uttered during a judicial proceeding is a “willful[] . . . obstruct[ion] of] . . . the administration of justice.” Must courts consider the effect of the lie? What about the speaker’s intent in communicating the lie? And how particular must this intent be? As I discuss below, the Guidelines only allow for an enhancement when the lie uttered was (1) likely to obstruct or impede the administration of justice and (2) intended to have that effect.