The Grenfell Tower fire - who’s to blame? A case of proactive and reactive accountability

The Grenfell Tower fire was a man-made disaster that happened on the 14th of June 2017 in North Kensington, London, and claimed 72 lives. The Phase 2 report of the statutory inquiry into the disaster has been recently published (Moore-Blick et al. 2024a), five years after the Phase 1 report (Moore-Blick 2019) and 7 years on from the disaster, and still the most pressing question for the community of North Kensington is whether anyone will be held accountable for the deaths of 72 people. In this paper, we attempt to facilitate a better understanding of how accountability mechanisms evolved in the wake of the Grenfell fire by emphasising the interplay between proactive and reactive accountability in the three phases of crisis management: pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis. To do so, we review both the phase 1 and the final phase 2 Grenfell Reports to identify areas where critical failures occurred. These show that the tragedy resulted from a collective failure of multiple actors - the emergency services, including the London Fire Brigade, the local authority, Tenant Management Organisation, and regulatory bodies, who all ignored proactive safety measures and warning signs. We argue that both proactive accountability and reactive accountability are key in crisis management, as they serve distinctive, yet complementary roles, as they inform preparedness and effective response throughout the crisis cycle. Accountability is not a static concept, but rather a process that requires different mechanisms at each stage of the crisis, and we suggest that our conceptualisation can help to understand how these mechanisms play out. Additionally, we hope that our findings will help improve regulatory and policy reforms, support the ongoing pursuit of justice for Grenfell victims, and inform future crisis management strategies in similar situations.