Factivism Defended -- A Reply To Howard

Factivism Defended: A Reply to Howard In his recent paper Primary Reasons as Normative Reasons Nathan Robert Howard argues that normative reasons are not purely facts (that it's raining; that I promised.. .), but also include goals (to avoid getting wet; to keep my promise.. .). Howard supplies three arguments for this thesis. This reply aims to show that those arguments are unsound. It also aims to show that Howard's view is itself subject to a dilemma. §1 introduces the debate; §2 responds to Howard's arguments; §3 presents the dilemma. First, a preliminary. Howard's focus is on objective normative reasons: Reasons there are for one to φ, as opposed to subjective normative reasons: Reasons one is suitably aware of, so that they can bear on what one does. Howard also restricts his attention to normative reasons for action. There's more to be said about these restrictions. But due to space, I simply follow Howard in making them.