Comparative Negligence and Comparative Contribution in Maine: The Need for Guidelines

In the recent case of Packard v. Whitten, Maine became the second state to adopt the doctrine of comparative contribution among joint tortfeasors. The decision stressed the point that comparative contribution was merely a logical outgrowth of Maine's Comparative Negligence Statute and that, in particular, the 1969 amendment to that law "would appear to have little purpose except to lay the basis for a comparative contribution." The court concluded that the implementation of this new doctrine would pose no major problems: "More than five years' experience in apportioning causal fault under our Comparative Negligence Law convinces us that this change as to contribution will result in no insuperable difficulties for the courts or juries." The success of any comparative fault system depends largely upon the creation of meaningful guidelines to assist in the application of comparative fault principles to various factual situations which may arise in the law of torts. Comparative fault law is potentially quite complex, and it is therefore essential that these guidelines be consistent enough to avoid confusion, yet flexible enough to be capable of just application to any case which may arise. In spite of the seven-year existence of comparative fault law in Maine, complete and satisfactory guidelines have not yet been established. The recent extension of comparative fault principles into the area of joint contribution among tortfeasors re-emphasizes this existing void and brings with it some new problems of its own. The existing state of Maine's comparative fault law (comparative negligence and comparative contribution) will be examined here, potential problem areas will be discussed, and some possible solutions will be presented. The experiences of other states also will be studied to the extent that they assist in a clearer understanding of these issues.