Система кримінальних правопорушень, що полягають у незаконній пропаганді

In the presented study, a set of criminal law norms is examined, which directly or indirectly encompass propagandistic acts deemed socially dangerous and, consequently, fall under the criminal legislation of Ukraine. The author not only illuminates contemporary approaches to assessing propaganda as a form of criminal activity but also raises the issue of ambiguous law enforcement in this area, linked, in particular, to the lack of a clear legislative definition of the term “propaganda” itself. Under such circumstances, there is a basis on which law enforcement and judicial bodies are compelled to rely on subjective evaluative categories, which, in turn, create risks of legal uncertainty. Under these conditions, a comparison of the positive and negative interpretations of “propaganda” becomes particularly relevant, as this concept is traditionally understood in a dual manner within public discourse. On the one hand, propaganda can serve as a tool for disseminating useful information (for instance, propaganda for a healthy lifestyle, education, or beneficial habits). On the other hand, propaganda may act as a means of manipulating mass consciousness, especially when it incites hostility, calls for violence, or justifies criminal regimes. In other words, propaganda can be used to impose aggressive political and militaristic ideas. This duality complicates its legal assessment because the boundary between exercising the constitutional right to freedom of thought and speech, as provided in Article 34 of the Constitution of Ukraine, and exerting a socially dangerous influence is quite thin. In this connection, the paper also draws attention to the legal positions of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine, which has indicated that freedom of speech is not absolute and can be restricted by law in certain cases. The author of the article highlights legal criteria that should guide the determination of the scope of criminalizing propaganda, especially under martial law, when the issue of information security becomes an element of national security in general. Based on an analysis of the norms of the Criminal Code of Ukraine, particularly Articles 109, 110, 111-1, 161, 436, 436-1, and 436-2, an attempt is made to outline the boundaries of criminal offenses related to propagandistic actions, as well as to identify the internal logic behind their differentiation. Alongside this, an argument is put forward regarding the need for legislative clarification of the concepts used within these criminal provisions to avoid overly broad interpretations that could violate the principle of legal certainty, one of the key elements of the rule of law.