Ex-rebel leaders and strategies of regime survival in Côte d'Ivoire

<p dir="ltr">How do political rulers in post-conflict states manage the threat posed by the former leaders of non-state armed groups? Ex-rebel leaders often retain access to material resources and informal armed networks, positioning these actors to either broker or thwart post-civil war regime consolidation. However, the strategies that rulers employ to control ex-rebel leaders remain poorly understood. Using Côte d’Ivoire as a theory-building case, we develop a typology of regime strategies based on whether ex-rebel leaders’ wartime networks are preserved or destroyed and whether ex-rebel leaders are integrated into the core of the regime. Co-optation refers to strategies that preserve wartime networks and grant ex-rebels access to state power in exchange for loyalty. In a spheres of influence strategy, ex-rebel leaders are granted autonomy at arm’s length from the inner regime. Purging involves actions that kill, jail, or otherwise marginalize ex-rebel leaders, while their networks are disbanded. Finally, bureaucratic shuffling involves technical-administrative measures intended to dissolve ex-rebel leaders’ ties to their constituencies, while still binding them closely to the regime. We examine how the Ivorian government has flexibly employed these strategies against former leaders of the Forces Nouvelles (FN) amid changing domestic and international conditions. Post-conflict regimes that calibrate strategies of control effectively can prove surprisingly resilient to threats from ex-rebel networks.