Co-creating Open Digital Platforms: Analyzing Java Standard Ecosystem

Open digital platforms (ODPs), such as open-source software (OSS) and standard-setting organizations (SSOs), share (partial) control of core platform technologies with complementors. In ODP, owners strategically open their core technology and adopt open-source licensing to cultivate cooperation among complementors, strengthen trust in the platform, and accelerate the diffusion and adoption of the platform. However, this shift gives rise to a co-opetitive environment (Bushee et al., 2024), wherein complementors collectively shape the platform's technological trajectory and engage in governance processes, even as they collaborate with—yet potentially compete against—one another. The question that arises from these dynamics is how does the co-opetitive environment inherent in ODPs influence the co-creation effort of the collaboratively produced artifact? Using data from an SSO affiliated with the Java platform, named JCP, we try to answer this question. Within the JCP, member firms collaboratively complement the Java platform through the co-development of Java standards. This study explores how external and internal factors of standards committees shape an essential aspect of co-created standards: the time required to agree on a final specification, known as "time to consensus" or TTC. TTC is a critical outcome in SSOs, where firms must reach a unanimous agreement before a standard can be published. Given the co-opetitive nature of SSOs, firms often diverge on technological choices due to the strategic implications of committee decisions for their proprietary strengths (Ranganathan & Rosenkopf, 2014). These conflicts can delay consensus (Simcoe, 2012), yet empirical evidence on what accelerates or hinders TTC remains scarce. We address this gap by investigating two central determinants: inter-firm competition as an external pressure and social capital within the JCP ecosystem network as an internal facilitator. Analyzing data from 284 standards over 18 years with the Cox hazard model, we discover that competition among committee members—spurred by rival industry sectors pursuing conflicting interests—extends the TTC. However, the JCP owner alters this dynamic by actively leading—bridging gaps, guiding discussions, and channeling competition into productive collaboration, speeding up consensus. Additionally, social capital—built through better trust and communication among members—generally hastens consensus. However, in committees with significant knowledge diversity, the effect flips, and TTC grows longer. In these varied groups, influential members may use their authority to push specific technical views, which are distant from each other due to knowledge diversity, dragging out negotiations.