Epistemic Justice and Institutional Responsibility in Academia: Toward a Comprehensive Framework for Epistemic Justice in Higher Education

This dissertation develops a framework for understanding epistemic justice as a core institutional responsibility of universities. I argue that higher education institutions act as stewards of an epistemic commons and therefore carry fiduciary-like duties to promote epistemic openness and prevent epistemic injustice. Drawing on the work of Miranda Fricker, Elizabeth Anderson, and traditions in fiduciary ethics, I extend the discussion by incorporating perspectives from educational philosophy (Mill, Freire, Rawls) and Chinese traditions such as Confucian reciprocity, Zhuangzian perspectivism, and Taoist epistemic humility. The analysis combines normative theory with comparative law, examining the UK’s Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Act 2023, Germany’s constitutional protections, France’s statutory ambiguity, and the Netherlands’ statutory minimalism. Case studies—including participatory methodologies, microfascist dynamics, and controversies in Groningen and Grenoble—illustrate how epistemic exclusion persists despite formal commitments to openness. I propose institutional mechanisms such as epistemic audits, oversight roles, inclusive pedagogy, and transparent accountability structures to embed epistemic justice in practice and strengthen the legitimacy of universities as custodians of knowledge. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.11063.38563