Dilemas de contención y apaciguamiento de Rusia: una reflexión desde la teoría cognitiva de las perspectivas

The large-scale invasion that Russia launched on 22 February 2022 continues to find its echo in the academic world, as it undoubtedly represents the most notable example of two contrasting interpretations. Given the imbalance of power between kyiv and Moscow in favour of the latter, the start of the invasion lent great credibility to the classic thesis of deterrence, according to which Russia was taking advantage of the weakness of a West unwilling to defend Ukraine. This reading is diametrically opposed to the interpretation according to which Russia reacted to what was perceived as a threat from the West. Thus, this article aims to recall the avenues of research offered by prospect theory as a theoretical basis for an alternative reading of war to the classic logic of deterrence. Although both the logic of deterrence and prospect theory offer rational explanations, the latter, which in fact also accommodates the former, is based on the changing and totally subjective perception of the actors and how they can act differently depending on whether the status quo is perceived as positive or negative. If the former were the case, an actor pursuing improvements would be easily deterred as the tendency to act in a risk-averse manner would prevail. Conversely, the same actor perceiving a worsening of the status quo would tend to take greater risks to reverse it. As will be shown here, both rational explanations can offer an interpretation of Russia's decisions, either as an actor determinedly pursuing an improvement of its status quo or as a preserver of the status quo taking risks to prevent its deterioration