Brewing Cooperation : The Inner Workings of the Norwegian and Swedish Beer Cartels, 1906–1956

This dissertation examines how the Norwegian and Swedish beer cartels’ inner workings developed to address the challenges of market saturation, temperance policies, and state intervention, 1906–1956. Drawing upon the archives of breweries, the breweries’ organizations, and state agencies, the study reveals how the beer cartels operated between market and morality, which both imposed limitations on and provided opportunities to the cartels and their members. The analysis shows that members’ behavior was more nuanced than cartel theory has traditionally assumed, highlighting tensions between profit incentives and the desire to enforce shared ideals such as loyal and fair competition. Operating within some of Europe’s strictest alcohol regimes, the beer cartels developed complex institutions to regulate competition and manage external pressures. Temperance policies played a central role as a catalyst for cartelization and drove the development of cartel institutions to monitor and enforce compliance with agreements and alcohol laws. Maintaining these institutions was, however, costly, time-consuming, and required legal expertise. The Norwegian cartel was able to position itself as a guarantor of rationalized production and high-quality products after the intervention of the state cartel agency during the interwar period. The Swedish cartel, meanwhile, lacked such requirements and became viewed as a guarantor of high prices and low quality that blocked the changes needed to rationalize the industry. The interplay between internal and external actors influenced the cartels’ development. External actors pressured the cartels to support domestic industries, accept increasing beer taxes, and limit consumption. In return, the cartels secured protection from foreign competition and domestic market entry, and tacit acceptance of high profits and competition restrictions. While most members profited handsomely from these policies during booms and busts, larger members benefited more in the long term. In conclusion, this dissertation highlights the nuances in cartel behavior, demonstrating how they can not merely react but proactively shape their environment despite strong external pressures. Furthermore, the results offer new insights into the relationship between business organizations and political regulations in regulating social issues.