The Resilience of Pyongyang's Nuclear Weapons: A Structural Perspective

The DPRK has been able to hold on to its militarized nuclear program despite the unanimous criticism of other regional actors in Northeast Asia. This is especially relevant when it comes to the US and China, two giants that constitute DPRK’s main foe and ally, respectively. This essay explains why, despite their vastly superior structural positions, the United States and China have not been able to put an end to Pyongyang’s nuclear program, a goal shared by both countries. It is suggested that in the ongoing scenario of structurally-induced competition, both Washington and Beijing have not been able to produce promises and threats that are credible enough to lead to disarmament. The resilience of Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons comes down to the fact that, due to that lack of credible promises and threats, the expected payoff for North Korean leadership in terms of political survival is higher if it retains its nuclear weapons.