The 4.5 Power-Sharing Model in Somalia : A Barrier or Catalyst for Sustainable Democracy?

This thesis examines Somalia's 4.5 clan-based power-sharing formula, investigating whether it serves as a barrier or catalyst for sustainable democratic governance. The system allocates equal political representation to four major clan families (Hawiye, Darod, Dir, and Digil-Mirifle/Rahanweyn) while minority clans collectively receive half a share. Though introduced at the 2000 Arta Peace Conference as a temporarysolution—encapsulated in President Guelleh's phrase "Xaq ma aha ee waa xal" ("It's not a fair system but a temporary solution")—the model has persisted for over two decades despite its absence from Somalia's 2012 Provisional Constitution. This research employs a qualitative methodology based on seven semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders and analysis of literature and policy documents to examine the interplay between traditional governance structures and modern constitutional frameworks. The study reveals that while the 4.5 formula initially contributed to political stabilization by ending warlord dominance, it has fundamentally undermined democratic development by institutionalizing clan-based politics. It creates what one interviewee termed "negative stability"—preventing any single clan from dominating while simultaneously obstructing progress toward merit-based governance. The system systematically excludes minority communities, who as one interviewee believes, constitute approximately one-third of Somalia's population yet are compressed into the ".5" category with disproportionately low representation. Government effectiveness suffers as appointments prioritize clan balance over competence. Through comparative analysis with other power-sharing arrangements, the research identifies reform pathways, including electoral threshold systems requiring cross-clan support and mixed representation systems that could gradually phase out clan quotas.