Nuclear Weapons in Conquest: Critical Analysis of Nuclear Deterrence Theory

Contrary to the logic of nuclear deterrence theory, which posits that states need nuclear weapons to prevent conquest, this research seeks to demonstrate that this issue is more complex than a division between those who possess nuclear weapons and those who do not. It aims to challenge traditional understandings of nuclear state military capabilities, contending that nuclear weapons are not the prevailing factor when deterring conquest. This paper conducts two case study analyses of previously explored cases in existing theoretical frameworks. The case study approach introduces a novel collection of historical contextual information previously undervalued by other theoretical frameworks. We observe a phenomenon where nuclear weapons, as well as weapons of mass destruction in general, do not dictate decisions regarding conquest in the state system. The mystery of what exactly can prevent conquest remains, but the answer does not lie in nuclear weapons. We hypothesize that other factors like technological development, domestic politics, and international relationships are greater predictors of successful prevention of conquest than the acquisition of nuclear weapons.