Missile Militia : How Hezbollah Evolved a Deterrence Strategy vis-à-vis Israel

This thesis aims to account for the mechanics of how Hezbollah evolved a deterrence strategy covering the period of 1992 to 2006.In the 1990s, a mutual deterrence relationship, predicated on punishment, emerged between Israel and Hezbollah.After Israel withdrew from Lebanon in 2000, deterrence was further expanded and operationalized both in the form of punishment and denial as exhibited in the 2006 Lebanon war.A case-driven process-tracing approach is adopted, developing a causal framework to holistically account for how these strategic evolutions occurred.The explanatory framework is rooted primarily in organizational learning and, to a lesser extent, in principal-agent theory.The strategic evolution framework holds that Hezbollah's strategy is aligned with learned tactical innovations enabled and encouraged by Iranian sponsorship.The findings show the initial evolution of deterrence by punishment starting in the 1990s occurred through a bottom-up alignment of strategy with tactical innovations.Conversely, the operationalization of deterrence by denial in the 2000 to 2006 period appears more like a top-down, centrally planned strategic evolution.The contribution serves to add nuance and depth to the various literatures on insurgent strategy, learning and state sponsorship of armed groups.The insights derived, whilst partial and casespecific, present the basis for future research into Hezbollah, specifically, and a launching pad for more general theories of change in insurgent strategy.