Of Hobbits, Collective Bargaining, and False Economic Emergencies: Accelerated Legislation and Political Constitutionalism

Many constitutional systems allow for an acceleration of the legislative process. Under New Zealand’s mechanism, the so-called urgency motion, the government can introduce and pass a bill within a single parliamentary sitting. New Zealand’s constitution is also strongly political, that is, parliamentary actions are mainly controlled by political means (such as general elections) rather than legal means (such as judicial review). This combination is highly concerning when viewed through the lens of securitisation theory. This theory posits that if the public perceives a political issue as an existential threat to a fundamental social value, the use of extraordinary measures is justified, such as accelerating the legislative process. Thus, if the government can influence the public narrative and make a political issue appear to be an existential threat, the use of urgency to pass it will be justified, irrespective of whether the issue really poses an existential threat. In such a case, the political constitutional safeguard of public censure of parliament fails, because the public has already been convinced that extraordinary measures are necessary and justified. The circumstances around passage of the “Hobbit Law” (the Employment Relations (the Film Industry Work) Amendment Act 2010) shows that political constitutions are vulnerable to the constitutional effects of securitisation of non-existentially threatening political issues.