The Failure of Bangladesh’s Constitutional Design

At independence in 1971, Bangladesh endorsed the Westminster parliamentary system. The choice was influenced, among others, by a desire to reverse the decades-long suppression by the Pakistani military’s authoritarian presidentialism. However, fifty-three years into its constitutional beginning, Bangladesh underwent various structural realignments such as a national party-led presidential government, several military-controlled presidential governments, authoritarian party governments, non-political caretaker governments during elections, one-party authoritarianism and lastly, another round extra-constitutional government led by non-political civil society elites. Despite all these, the 1972 scheme of parliamentary government has survived as a barebone structure. Structurally, with the rise of omnipotent Prime Ministerial dictatorship and a bureaucratic state, the legislative, judicial, and fourth-branch institutions have been brought to their knee. This chapter argues that at least four identifiable factors contribute to the failure of Bangladesh's constitutional design. The first one is the concentration of political and government powers in persons (personalization of power). The second one is the rise of a powerful civil-military establishment causing periodic military interventions and strong bureaucratic grip over public power. The third one is the lack of intra-party democracy leading to a purely partisan delegate model of political representation that clips the parliament’s scrutiny and accountability power and brings down the key democratic institutions to their knee. The fourth one is the lack of space for political opposition leading to crudely majoritarian politics that fail the country’s basic democratic processes such as free and fair elections, and regular and peaceful transfer of power.