The Epistemic and Moral Harms of Hermeneutical Marginalization

This paper explores the extent to which hermeneutical marginalization constitutes both epistemic and moral harms, and why as knowers we ought to take issue with hermeneutical marginalization beyond its instrumental harms, such as hermeneutical injustice. I establish that there are three criteria hermeneutical resources must meet in order to be well suited to fulfill their functions, and then explain how hermeneutical marginalization poses a direct threat to each of these features. I then defend the claim that we should not be critical of hermeneutical injustice only because of its instrumental harms. I do this by defining the intrinsic epistemic harms of hermeneutical marginalization, followed by a defense of both the instrumental and intrinsic moral harms of hermeneutical marginalization. In the final section of the paper I demonstrate why one proposed solution to hermeneutical marginalization, the practice of speaking for others, ultimately fails to address the moral and epistemic issues this kind of marginalization promotes.