Effekten av konkurrens för fastighetsmäklares kommunikation till bostadssäljare av förväntat pris

Purpose – The purpose of this study is to explore and analyze if competition impacts Swedish real estate agents’ communication of potential sales price at the intake meeting. It also aims to further explore how agency theory can explain this relationship between the agent and the principal. The study aims to answer 4 research questions (1) Do Swedish real estate agents perceive competition to influence how the potential sales price is communicated to the seller? (2) How do agents communicate potential sales price to the seller? (3) How does communication of potential sales price to the seller differ in relation to the level of competition? (4) What other aspects influence the communication of potential sales price to the seller? Design/Methodology/Approach – The study adopted a mixed method design and reported on a survey distributed to all Swedish licensed residential real estate agents to explore their perceptions of the impact of competition had at the intake meeting. The survey consists of seven main questions that refer to the perception of both the respondents’ own attitudes, as well as the impact on sellers’ price expectations when communicated by competitors. Additionally, 20 semi-structured interviews were held with active real estate agents in 4 different geographical areas around Stockholm looking to explore in-depth on how potential sales price was communicated to sellers. Findings – The empirical results show a clear pattern of agents perceiving competition at the intake meeting to be correlated with higher potential sales prices being communicated to the seller. The results also show that agents adopt different strategies for communicating potential sales price to enhance their competitive edge towards other agents. The results also suggest that agency theory is applicable to the relationship between agent and seller already from their initial contact. Practical implications – The study contributes to policymakers understanding that informational asymmetry is leveraged by agents to create a competitive advantage at the intake meeting. It carries few consequences under the current legal framework.