Презумпція невинуватості у Міжнародному кримінальному суді: загальна характеристика

The article provides a general characteristic of the presumption of innocence in the International Criminal Court. It is noted that in the International Criminal Court the presumption of innocence is neither a new concept nor semantically different for understanding from national legal proceedings. In the most general formulation, this presumption is reduced to the right “to be presumed innocent until proven guilty in court”. It is considered as a fundamental principle of criminal justice and the right to a fair trial, which should ensure respect for human dignity during proceedings in international criminal courts. Both a narrow and a broad approach to understanding the presumption of innocence is explored. It is underlined that according to Article 66, paragraph 1 of the ICC Statute, “everyone shall be presumed innocent until proven guilty before the Court in accordance with applicable law.” This formulation of the presumption of innocence differs from similar norms of international human rights instruments and statutes of ad hoc international criminal tribunals. According to Article 66, paragraph 1 of the ICC Statute, not only the suspect or accused is entitled to the presumption of innocence, but “everyone,” that is, any person. It is emphasized that the initial draft of the Statute of the International Criminal Court provided for the presumption of innocence of “the accused,” but the Preparatory Committee changed this formulation to “everyone.” Therefore, the presumption of innocence is aimed not only at protecting suspects or accused, but also appellants who have been convicted by the Trial Chamber and sentenced or whose cases are on appeal. It is emphasized that the presumption of innocence does not oblige the prosecutor to refrain from expressing an opinion on the evidence to prove the guilt or innocence of the suspect or accused, at least during the trial. On the contrary, Article 66 of the Rome Statute provides that “the burden of proving the guilt of the accused shall rest with the Prosecutor”. Thus, the requirement of impartiality imposes different obligations on the prosecutor and the judges. Particular attention is paid to the genesis of the understanding of the presumption of innocence during the development of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.

Publication Details

Journal
Scientific periodicals of Ukraine
Published
2025-05-31
Primary Topic
War, Law, and Justice
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
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article

Презумпція невинуватості у Міжнародному кримінальному суді: загальна характеристика

Scientific periodicals of Ukraine
War, Law, and Justice
article

Презумпція невинуватості у Міжнародному кримінальному суді: загальна характеристика

article en

Abstract

The article provides a general characteristic of the presumption of innocence in the International Criminal Court. It is noted that in the International Criminal Court the presumption of innocence is neither a new concept nor semantically different for understanding from national legal proceedings. In the most general formulation, this presumption is reduced to the right “to be presumed innocent until proven guilty in court”. It is considered as a fundamental principle of criminal justice and the right to a fair trial, which should ensure respect for human dignity during proceedings in international criminal courts. Both a narrow and a broad approach to understanding the presumption of innocence is explored. It is underlined that according to Article 66, paragraph 1 of the ICC Statute, “everyone shall be presumed innocent until proven guilty before the Court in accordance with applicable law.” This formulation of the presumption of innocence differs from similar norms of international human rights instruments and statutes of ad hoc international criminal tribunals. According to Article 66, paragraph 1 of the ICC Statute, not only the suspect or accused is entitled to the presumption of innocence, but “everyone,” that is, any person. It is emphasized that the initial draft of the Statute of the International Criminal Court provided for the presumption of innocence of “the accused,” but the Preparatory Committee changed this formulation to “everyone.” Therefore, the presumption of innocence is aimed not only at protecting suspects or accused, but also appellants who have been convicted by the Trial Chamber and sentenced or whose cases are on appeal. It is emphasized that the presumption of innocence does not oblige the prosecutor to refrain from expressing an opinion on the evidence to prove the guilt or innocence of the suspect or accused, at least during the trial. On the contrary, Article 66 of the Rome Statute provides that “the burden of proving the guilt of the accused shall rest with the Prosecutor”. Thus, the requirement of impartiality imposes different obligations on the prosecutor and the judges. Particular attention is paid to the genesis of the understanding of the presumption of innocence during the development of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.

Scientific periodicals of Ukraine
Peace, Justice and strong institutions
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War, Law, and Justice
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