Weak-Willed Legislatures and Statutory Interpretation

Not all statutes are created equal. Contributing to the literature on “super statutes,” I suggest that an analogy to the philosophical concept of weakness of will can illuminate circumstances under which some statutes ought to stand above others. Analogizing to philosopher Richard Holton’s account of weak will, I develop an account in which some statutes express long-term commitments, are intended to foreclose future deliberation, and enact reasons into the law. Such statutes have the status of what Holton calls “resolutions.” Like an individual resolving to stop eating meat, yet finding themself unable to resist, Congress can be weak willed when it violates such statutes, and this weak-willed action jeopardizes the advantages of enacting such statutes in the first place. I then propose that courts may apply familiar canons of statutory interpretation—the presumption against implied repeal, appropriations canon, and Charming Betsy canon—to hold Congress accountable to its commitments. This account also provides a new normative justification for each of these canons of statutory interpretation