Seyyid Şerîf Cürcânî’de İlahi Fiillerin Nedenliliği

In this article, al-Jurjani's views on the causality of divine actions will be examined. His important conceptual contributions to the subject will be revealed and the dimension he added to the fundamental views of the Ash'ari school of thought to which he is affiliated will be evaluated. The issue of whether divine actions can be caused by any purpose has been discussed in the science of theology, mostly in relation to the issues of salah-aslah and husn-qubh. However, the basis of this issue is also based on causality, which is one of the important topics discussed in both theology and philosophy. Scheols of theology have tried to base the problem, which is addressed in terms of the relationship between Allah and the universe and Allah and man, on their views on whether there is any cause-effect relationship in the functioning of beings and events and the occurrence of human actions. The majority of theologians apparently accepted the existence of a cause-effect relationship and argued that this relationship was not necessary and avoided limiting the divine will and power. They saw Allah as the creator and the first cause of everything. In this context, the Ash'aris and Ma-turidis considered causality invalid in terms of both human actions and the functioning of nature. The Mu'tazila, on the other hand, had a positive approach to human actions but considered causa-lity invalid in terms of the functioning of nature. This attitude of the schools of theology was reflec-ted in their discussions on whether divine actions could be realized based on a reason or purpose. They tried to unravel the connection between the absoluteness of divine power and the attribution of moral concepts, which are derived from the sensible world, to God. Theologians agree that there is no purpose for Allah’s essence and that He contains wisdom and benefits for His servants. However, they have adopted different approaches on whether there can be a reason and purpose for Allah that would direct the divine will to perform actions that contain this wisdom and benefits. The Mu'tazila accepted that the actions of Allah contain wisdom and benefit, that is to say an action without a purpose would be futile, and that Allah created all creatures for the benefit of man, and therefore they welcomed the attribution of divine actions to a cause. They displayed an understan-ding that placed divine justice at the center, seeing it as necessary for Allah to do what is best for his servants. Since the Ash'aris accepted that divine actions are inherently wise, they accepted that di-vine actions cannot be attributed a cause, based on the idea that having a wisdom or purpose direc-ted towards someone else in the actions would be a deficiency for Allah. They have avoided discour-ses that limit the divine will by embracing the idea that nothing is obligatory for God. Although the Maturidis accept that divine actions are wise and contain many favors and blessings towards the servants, they also adopted the view that doing wise actions is not obligatory for Allah and that actions that are wise cannot be considered as a disease. Ultimately, the theologians guided their dis-course by accepting the fact that God's actions are wise. While the Mu'tazila regarded wisdom and benefit as causes, the Maturidis did not regard wisdom a cause. The Ash'aris, on the other hand, regarded divine actions as positive qualities inherent in their essence. Arguing that divine actions cannot be caused by any reason, Jurjani stated that divine actions have a purpose in terms of Him-self and a benefit in terms of his actions, and that these come after the actions. Jurjani absolutely does not accept the concepts of malice and ulterior motive for divine actions because these concepts express the reasons and purposes that prompt Allah to perform the action. However, this situation is unacceptable for the actions of Allah. Yet, he thinks that the terms “purpose” and “benefit” can be used for divine actions because these concepts are not related to any intention or purpose for the agent. With these explanations, Jurjani clarified the Ash'arite defense that divine actions cannot be caused by a reason or purpose. He tried to establish the views of the Ash'ari on a solid ground by expanding the conceptual dimension of the discussion in terms of purpose and benefit and displayed a supportive attitude.