Real Possibilities for Husserl's Correlation between Truth and Evidence

Already before endorsing transcendental idealism, Husserl pairs truths and possibilities of evidence.This 'correlationism' is central for phenomenological metaphysics, but it remains disputed how it determines truth and evidence, including whether it gives a form of priority to either notion.I approach these questions by focusing on the employed notion of possibility and its changes between Husserl's early and later work.While originally formulating correlationism in terms of ideal possibilities, Husserl realizes that this cannot be extended to account for contingent truths.He then discusses the correlation principle in terms of those ideal possibilities that are motivated.But this faces simple objections: 1.) possibilities can be motivated by false beliefs, and 2.) we can be contingently ignorant about possibilities of evidence.The problem is that the shift from ideal to motivated possibility replaces an alethic with an epistemic notion of possibility.One may in response try to characterize real possibilities in terms of the contingent truths of the actual world, but then the characterization of truth in terms of real possibilities becomes circular.A more promising alternative is to replace the noetic factor 'motivation' with a noematic factor 'potentiality'.On this reading, the correlationist thesis asserts that any obtaining state of affairs has a potentiality for recognition in evident judgement.