Person and thinking Self in the third Paralogism: Between Nature and Freedom

This article analyzes the third paralogism of the Transcendental Dialectic of the Critique of Pure Reason, entitled «of personality». In it, Kant criticizes the way of reasoning of rational psychology, which bases the claim that the soul is a person on the assumption of the numerical identity of the self. Our aim is to study the Kantian position on personal identity and the thinking self from the point of view of the conflict between nature and freedom. We consider that the relation to this conflict involves two aspects: On the one hand, the question whether the discourse of the third paralogism situates the thinking self in an order other than the natural mechanical one; and, on the other hand, whether this discourse contributes to the concept of person. Based on this approach, we will not only look at what Kant criticizes (pars destruens) but also at what he admits.