The Free Will of a Sinless Incarnate God and the Dispositional Incarnation Model: A Response to Swinburne

This article offers a critical response to Richard Swinburne's “The Free Will of a Sinless Incarnate God”. Swinburne addresses an apparent contradiction in traditional Christology: how Christ can possess a human nature, including genuine free will, while being necessarily sinless. After reviewing Swinburne's proposed solution - that Christ was predetermined not to sin but still experienced genuine temptation - I develop an objection based on Kane's libertarian theory of free will. I argue that genuine human freedom necessarily involves Self-Forming Actions where alternative possibilities, including the possibility to sin, are genuinely available. Since Christ, on Swinburne's account, lacks this capacity, he cannot possess genuine human freedom and thus lacks an essential component of human nature. I propose the Dispositional Incarnation Model as the most robust solution to this dilemma, as it allows Christ to possess genuine libertarian freedom at the occurrent level of his human experience while securing his sinlessness through his divine nature dispositionally exemplified. This, rather than the solution proposed by Swinburne, provides the conceptual basis for one affirming the traditional Chalcedonian claim that Christ is “perfect in humanity” and “like us in all respects except for sin”.