The Clobes Conundrum: Why Muldrow Should Not Apply to Hostile Work Environment Claims and How the Eighth Circuit Got It Right

In 2024, the Supreme Court held that an employee does not have to prove material harm to prevail on a discrimination claim under Title VII. Because hostile work environment claims also derive from Title VII, courts and litigants are currently grappling with whether this ruling upends the long-standing “severe or pervasive” doctrine. This Note argues that it does not. Passed in 1964, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act makes it illegal for “an employer . . . to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” This provision of Title VII is commonly known as the disparate treatment provision. Beginning in the 1970s, federal courts developed various analytical frameworks for evaluating discrimination claims, some of which have not accurately represented the statute’s text. One such doctrine is the “materially adverse” requirement, which provides that a plaintiff must show that their discrimination resulted from a sufficiently adverse action from their employer. Many federal courts applied this doctrine for decades. But in the recent case of Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, Missouri, the Supreme Court held that, by its terms, Title VII does not contain a materiality requirement, nor any other “heightened bar.” To bring a discrimination claim under the Muldrow approach, a plaintiff need only show “some harm respecting an identifiable term or condition of employment